I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
Susanna Schellenberg is a Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and an Executive Council Faculty Member of the Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science. Her work focuses on a range of topics in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. She is particularly interested in the nature of perceptual content, the epistemic role of perceptual experience, and mental capacities.